Abstract: Contemporary literature dealing with the governance and exploitation of common-pool 9 natural resources was initiated by Elinor Ostrom in 1990, and has been growing fast ever since. On 10 the contrary, within the same research stream, the study of the presence and economic role of 
Introduction

28
Following the growing evidence on the necessity to accomplish environmentally sustainable 29 economic development, the study of the governance and exploitation of natural resources gained 
86
The strategy of the paper is as follows: Section Two deals with the definition, economic relevance,
87
pattern of emergence and optimal dimension of non-divided capital funds in both investor owned 88 companies and co-operative enterprises. In Section Three, the origin and spread of common capital 
Common Resources in Investor Owned and in Co-operative Enterprises
95
One initial key question in this study concerns the reasons why the analysis of common pool capital 96 resources is largely absent in contemporary economics and organization literatures. The proposed 97 answer concerns the dominant system of property rights, whose concentration and exclusivity limits 98 the economic and organizational relevance of communalities in the ownership of enterprises. 2 
99
The accumulation of owned capital is observed in all enterprise forms since it is functional to 100 financing investment programs, buffering the organization against negative unpredicted events, and 
Common Capital Resources in Investor Owned Companies
116
The strictly private nature of capital resources in IOFs strongly reduces as a norm, and often 117 eliminates the relevance communality, since shares are saleable and, in most cases, ownership is 118 concentrated in a few hands. Decision-making becomes exclusive, and excludability in utilization is 119 perfect after contractual constraints have been fulfilled. This is the standard observed solution in 120 small to medium sized firms, and in family businesses, which are dominant in numbers in all 121 contemporary economies.
122
However, even in the case of IOFs, capital resources can acquire a relevant degree of communality 123 when the firm is constituted as joint stock. More specifically, as the number of stockholders increases,
124
and no stockholder achieves dominant position (ownership is dispersed), costly exit due to sunkness 125 of capital resources and investments and to asset specificity can induce a high degree of rivalry in the 126 utilization of resources and in the appropriation of the surplus. In the same situation, non-127 excludability in decision making, in the utilization of assets, and in the distribution of value added is 128 likely to be high as well. 3 
129
As said, a high degree of rivalry and non-excludability is to be considered, in IOFs, as exception, not
130
as the rule, due to concentrated ownership. Furthermore, even in the presence of a high degree of 131 non-excludability in decision making and capital utilization, the "exit" option represented by the sale 132 of stocks can allow stockholders to recoup the value of their financial investments. In other words,
133
the sale of owned stocks can be the preferred choice whenever non-excludability in decision making 
Common Capital Resources in Co-operative Firms
143
Co-operative enterprises are here understood as mutual benefit organizations characterized by 144 membership rights that are not assigned on the basis of financial investments, but instead to 145 individuals (e.g. in worker co-operatives) or to economic activities (e.g. in producer co-operatives) on 146 the basis of the "one member, one vote" rule [29] [30] . Indivisible or common reserves of capital in co-
147
3 This argument may be even more valid in widely held joint-stock and in publicly quoted companies characterized by fragmented shareholdership, in which no dominant position is detected. In spite of dispersed ownership, the emergent dominant role of the management due to separation between ownership and control can reduce the problems related to communality thanks to centralized decision-making (cfr. The classic by Berle and Means, [70] ). The same result would not be possible in co-operatives since, in their case, managers are appointed by members' representatives, and need to respond more closely to their preferences [46] . In this case, communality and the connected behavioral biases such as free-riding can represent a more serious challenge. 4 In an evolutionary interpretation, concentrated ownership can be considered a central autopoietic property of capitalist property rights [71, 72] . 
225
One final question that has crucial bearing on the working of the institutional system for capital 226 accumulation relates to the ownership of net residuals. In the first institutional system, ownership is 227 clearly attributed to the membership, which has to devise proper rules to distribute or to reinvest it,
228
at its will, in shareable reserves of capital. On the other hand, the second and third system are 
293
In continental Europe, instead, where much larger diffusion of (legally mandated) non-divided 294 reserves of capital is recorded, demutualization has less often been observed, and this fact has better 295 supported the sustainability and longevity of co-operatives. 14 296
Undercapitalization, Common Ownership, and Diffusion of Co-operatives
297
While in civil law countries the accumulation of indivisible reserves is, as a norm, required by law, 
305
The legally imposed accumulation of indivisible reserves showed to be effective in preventing This has been the reason for the disappearance of the well-known group of lumberjack plywood cooperatives in the US pacific North West: the high market value of the members' financial stakes made the sale of these organizations to external investors more convenient than the sale on the market for membership rights to new incoming co-operators. 13 The small total number of co-operatives, economy-wide, is also explained by small numbers of creation of new ventures, not by their short lived active existence, which is indeed longer than the average duration of investor owned companies [55].
14 In Italy, demutualization is allowed by law only after the demutualizing co-operative renounces the whole value of its asset, which is to be paid out to national funds financing new co-operative start-ups. 
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368
As previously anticipated, underinvestment due to members' truncated temporal horizon, which 369 arises when the median member's horizon is lower than the optimal duration of investment programs,
370
represents the most classical problem concerning non-divided ownership. This problem may be 371 especially serious in worker co-operatives, due to high members' turnover, especially when the 372 median temporal horizon is short and the median age of members is high. It engenders lower than 373 optimal investment schedules and higher then optimal distribution of income and dividends to 
399
The Optimal Amount of Non-Divided Capital Resources
400
In order to single out the optimal or preferred amount of non-divided resources, the advantages 401 deriving from common ownership need to be compared with their costs, and with the corresponding 402 costs and benefits attached to individual ownership.
403
The comparison of costs and benefits is complex as it requires analysis of transactional, operational, 
425
The non-divisibility and non-salability of common assets, when decision-making and conflict costs 426 are kept under control, can lead to better alignment, and have empowering effects on collective action.
427
16 A detailed comparison of the benefits attached to different ownership forms is outside the scope of this paper, which is limited to the cost side. 
438
One of the most salient consequences of the introduction of capital indivisibility is better financial 439 and economic sustainability due to patrimonial stability, and increased longevity of co-operatives.
440
Contrary to the predictions of the best-known models in economic theory [38, 41] 
478
The paper strived to explain, within the new-institutionalist frame of analysis, the pattern of 
483
A strong compatibility and linkage between collective entrepreneurial action in co-operative 484 enterprises, and the emergence of non-divided forms of ownership has been evidenced.
485
The main implication of this work is that common resources, when tragedy of the commons-like 
497
divisible and divisible capital reserves [56] .
498
The main implication of the study concerns the impact of common ownership on patrimonial stability
499
and on the sustainability and longevity of co-operatives. While existing models are not able to explain 500 in a satisfactory way the survival, diffusion and longevity of organizational forms characterized by 501 common ownership, this paper has found strong connection between these two elements. The 
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